What Are the Two Basic Principles of Natural Law Theory

/What Are the Two Basic Principles of Natural Law Theory

What Are the Two Basic Principles of Natural Law Theory

Fuller`s functionalist conception of the law implies that nothing can be considered a law unless it is capable of fulfilling the essential function of the law, of directing behavior. And to fulfill this function, a set of rules must fulfill the following principles: Even within the constraints imposed by the theses that make up the paradigmatic position of natural law, there are a number of possible variations in the point of view. Here we will examine some questions that need to be addressed from each individual point of view of natural law, and some of the difficulties that arise in finding possible answers to these questions. Natural law consists of those commandments of eternal law that govern the behavior of beings who possess reason and agency. The first commandment of natural law, according to Aquinas, is the somewhat empty imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it should be noted that Aquinas advocates a theory of the morality of natural law: what is right and wrong according to Aquinas is derived from the rational nature of man. Good and evil are therefore both objective and universal. The strongest construction of the overlap thesis forms the basis of the classical naturalism of Aquinas and Blackstone. Aquinas distinguishes four types of laws: (1) the eternal law; (2) natural law; (3) human rights; and (4) God`s law.

The eternal law consists of those laws that govern the nature of an eternal universe; As Susan Dimock (1999, 22) puts it, one can “think that eternal law encompasses all these scientific questions (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.).” Laws by which the universe is ordered. God`s law deals with the standards that must be fulfilled by a person in order to attain eternal salvation. God`s law cannot be discovered by natural reason alone; The commandments of God`s law are revealed only through divine revelation. A more interesting argument has recently been taken up by Brian Bix (1996). Echoing John Finnis (1980), Bix rejects Aquinas and Blackstone`s interpretation as conceptual naturalists, arguing instead that the assertion that an unjust law is not a law should not be taken literally: however, it must be recognized that a coherent theorist of natural law could hardly claim that knowledge derived from human well-being is the only possible knowledge. Because it is part of the paradigm of the view of natural law that the basic principles of natural law are known to all, and the kind of arguments that should be advanced to produce derived knowledge about human well-being are certainly not (or even may have) by everyone. (Recently, Jensen (2015) offered an in-depth defense of a derivative account to address these concerns.) Another way Aquinas` account of knowledge of basic goods was understood—and this is an understanding better able to control the generalized knowledge of basic goods—can be called “tilt thinking.” From this point of view, the explicit seizure of basic assets on the persistent direction follows the pursuit of certain objectives, the frankness of which implies an implicit seizure of these objects as good, but not derived from them. Thus, people show a tendency to pursue life, knowledge and friendship and so on; And thinking about this tendency leads to an immediate understanding of the truth that life, knowledge, friendship and so on are goods. The affirmation of the statements “Life is good”, “knowledge is good”, “friendship is good”, etc. makes it understandable that rational beings like us are persistently pursuing these goals. If we focus on the receiver of natural law, that is, we humans, the thesis of Aquinas` theory of natural law comes to the fore that natural law represents the basic principles of practical rationality for man and has this status by nature (ST IaIIae 94:2).

The idea that the law of nature is the basic principles of practical rationality implies, for Aquinas, that the two commandments of natural law are inherently universally binding (ST IaIIae 94:4) and that the rules of natural law are inherently universally recognizable (ST IaIIae 94:4; 94:6). The important things that [conceptual naturalism] supposedly allows us to do (for example. B morally evaluating the law and determining our moral obligations in relation to the law) are in fact complicated by the collapse of the distinction between morality and law. If we really want to look at the law from a moral point of view, it can obscure the task if we consider that law and morality are essentially related in one way or another. Moral criticism and legal reform can be supported by an initial moral skepticism about the law. According to Hobbes, there are nineteen laws. The first two are described in Chapter XIV of Leviathan (“the first and second laws of nature; and contracts”); the others in Chapter XV (“Other Laws of Nature”). Thus, Bix interprets Aquinas and Blackstone as having views more similar to John Finnis` neonatalism discussed below in Section III. However, while a plausible argument may be made for Bix`s point of view, the long history of Aquinas and Blackstone`s interpretation as conceptual naturalists, as well as their educational value in the development of other legal theories, ensure that this practice is likely to continue indefinitely. .

By |2022-04-11T14:55:44+00:00abril 11th, 2022|Sem categoria|0 Comentários

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